

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RI

**Commander Combined Naval Component Command;**  
A Significant Change in a Command Relationship

By


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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.


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## *Abstract of:*

### **Commander Combined Naval Component Command; A Significant Change in a Command Relationship**

On 25 June 1950, the United States SEVENTH Fleet was ordered to sail from its bases, in the Philippines and Japan, and to operate "*in support*" of the United States Army in Korea. During the Korean War, the navy ably supported the forces ashore, providing mobility, gun fire, logistics, and air support. This "*in support*" role of the SEVENTH Fleet remained mostly unchanged for over 45 years until 11 January 1992 when Commander SEVENTH Fleet relinquished his "*in support*" role to become the Commander Combined Naval Component Command (CCNCC).

In this new relationship, during conditions of war or under conditions of increased tensions, Commander SEVENTH Fleet chops to the Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC) and his deputy becomes Commander in Chief Republic of Korea Fleet (CINCROKFLT). This paper will explain the significance of SEVENTH Fleet's designation as CCNCC and the consequences of this change on U.S. Navy and Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) combined operations.

In addition, this paper will examine combined naval operations in the Korean area of operations (AO) during three periods, the Korean War (1951-53), after the formation of the Combined Forces Command (1978-1991), and after designation of COMSEVENTHFLT as CCNCC (1992-1996). This paper will analyze the tasks assigned the Naval Component Command during those three time periods, determined if **unity of command** has been achieved, and if the naval forces ability to conduct combined operations have improved or declined since 1953.

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*"Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command."*  
Napoleon in *Maxims of War*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The strategic goal of collective security and the resultant alliances and coalitions into which the United States has entered require that its Armed Forces be prepared for multinational military operations. There is no singular doctrine for multinational warfare; each alliance develops its protocols and contingency plans. Much of the information and guidance provided for joint operations is applicable to multinational operations; however, differences in allied doctrine, organization, weapons and equipment, terminology, culture, religion, and language must be taken into account.<sup>1</sup> Before examining multinational operations in the Korean area of operations (AO), two questions require clarification. The naval forces involved in the Korean War operated as an ad hoc coalition more or less under U.N. authorization. What relationships exist now between the U.S. and Korean military forces – alliance or coalition? Navy forces at the start of the Korean War were presumably **unified** under the Commander Naval Forces Far East. Unity of effort/command slowly evolved during the course of the war. Should naval forces in the “next” Korean War settle for **unity of effort** or should **unity of command** be the ultimate goal from the start?

### Coalition or Alliance

Coalitions differ from alliances in that they are more loosely bound and usually focus on a single objective, often disbanding after the objective is met. According to Joint Pub 3-0:

- An **alliance** is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an example of an alliance.
- A **coalition** is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for command actions, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War.<sup>2</sup>

Alliances are often an ongoing relationship between nations that are documented by a formal agreement or publicized by membership in an organization. Since 1951 the United States and Korea have agreed upon a common doctrine and strategy, a common objective, common rules of engagement, and a Mutual Defense Treaty. Obviously this is not an ad hoc relationship and therefore will be considered an alliance for this paper.

## Unity of Effort or Command

There is considerable disagreement in joint publications and doctrine concerning the goal of an alliance with regards to unity of command or effort. Joint Pub 0-2 states that for any multinational operation "*Unity of command may not be politically feasible but should be a goal if at all possible.*"<sup>3</sup> Field Manual (FM) 100-5 defines unity of effort as coordination and cooperation among all forces even though they may not necessarily be part of the same command structure toward a commonly recognized objective.<sup>4</sup> According to Joint Pub 1, "*The first application is unity of effort.*" It is listed in many publications as the first Principle of War. Joint Pub 1, defines unity of effort as a fundamental of joint warfare—success in war demands that all effort be directed toward the achievement of common aims.<sup>5</sup>

Unity of command is defined by the Doctrine for Joint Operations as directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. In addition, Doctrine for Joint Operations goes farther to say:

It is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires **unity of command**. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by **vesting a single commander** with the requisite authority to direct and to coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.<sup>6</sup>

Joint Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5 list unity of command as one of the Principles of War, and emphasizes the importance of all forces operating under a **single commander**.<sup>7</sup> This paper has already established that Korea is an alliance operation. With the possibility of over 300 ROK and U.S. Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft operating in the confined spaces of the Korean littorals, a divided command in the "next" Korean War could result in confusion and tragedy. This paper will operate under the principle that not only is unity of command possible in an alliance operation, it is the best solution in the Korean AO.

*"For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort."*

FM 100-5

## **COMBINED NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR**

On 25 June 1950, the army of the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea stormed across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and invaded the Republic of South Korea. Weakened by the drastic cutbacks in defense spending after World War II, the U.S. armed forces were hard pressed to delay much less stop the onrushing North Korean People's Army. Only a small number of Navy carrier and Air Force planes were on hand to strike enemy front-line units and supply convoys.<sup>8</sup>

Combat units assigned to Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE) and COMSEVENTFLT totaled one carrier, two cruisers, three destroyer divisions, two patrol squadrons, and a handful of submarines. COMSEVENTHFLT had conducted no joint or combined training since the end of World War II.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) was composed of 4 high speed patrol vessels, 17 old U.S. and Japanese minesweepers, a few picket boats, one tank landing ship, and one subchaser. The ROKN was at the bottom of the Korean military "food chain." As an example of their funding problems, their newest ship, Patrol Craft (PC) 701, *Bak Du San*, was purchased by subscription of naval personnel and had just arrived in country from the United States.<sup>9</sup>

On 29 June 1951, the British Admiralty placed Royal Navy in Japanese waters at the disposition of ComNavFE, the next day similar action was taken by the Australian government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to sail; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

In the first days of the war the ComNavFE staff was totally inadequate. The total strength of the staff in June 1950 was 188, by the end of November 1950, it would reach 1,227. ComNavFE was required to evacuate American citizens, support the Republic of Korea, blockade the North Korean coastline, and at the same time remain prepared for attacks on his Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) by the People's Republic of China. With the combined force of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, the ROKN, and the United States SEVENTH Fleet under his operational control (OPCON), ComNavFE's staff was ill-prepared to conduct combined planning or operations. There were no plans for the defense of Korea. There were no naval Korean interpreters available for liaison with ROKN ships and no ROKN officers on either



ComNavFE or SEVENTH Fleet staffs. Figure (1) reflects the command relationships of the combined naval forces.

The ROK Navy, shortly to become TG 96.7, was assigned blockade and inshore work south of latitude 37 degrees *with "such assistance as might become available from any NavFE units that happened by."* This resulted in the first naval tragedy of the war. In July 1950, the USN cruiser Juneau sank ROKN Minelayer 305 as it was withdrawing South Korean troops from the beach with great loss of life.<sup>10</sup> Shortly following the sinking of Minelayer 305, a separate East and West Task Groups were established with the USN on the East Coast and the Commonwealth Navy on the West coast. The ROKN (TG 96.7) was placed OPCON to the Commonwealth Navy and a USN officer was placed in overall command of TG 96.7.

To further simplify command relations the various task groups operating under ComNavFE were consolidated, and the Korea Support Group, Task Group 96.5, upgraded into Task Force 95. Overall command of the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force was assigned to the West Coast Support Group, now TG 95.1 under Commonwealth command, and the East Coast Support Group under USN command (Figure 2).

Between July and September 1950, fleet units in the Far East established superiority in the East and West Sea and in the air over it allowing General Douglas MacArthur to launch a surprise amphibious assault at Inchon. The command arrangement during this period is as reflected in figure (2). In this relationship, the ROKN remained a separate task group within the structure of the U.N. command. The U.S. Navy avoided any direct involvement in combined operations by assigning all foreign units to Rear Admiral Andrewes's West Coast Group. At an early date that commander was confiding to his war diary his need for *the "gift of tongues."*<sup>11</sup>

During planning conferences held with ComNavFE on 31 March 1951, it was decided that Task Forces 92, 95 and destroyers of Task Group 96.7 should be placed under the operational control of SEVENTH Fleet so that all naval forces in the Far East, with the exception of the amphibious and submarine forces, would be under a **single operational commander**. Consequently detailed planning for the integration of these forces into the SEVENTH Fleet and the determination of a concept for their operation became an immediate task. Figure (3) reflects the command relationships of U.N. and ROK forces from 02 April 1951 until Armistice. The stated reason for this relationship change was *"to coordinate better the air and surface units engaged in interdiction, naval gunfire support and blockade."*<sup>12</sup>

On 15 April 1951, COMSEVENTFLT inspected the ROK Naval installations at Pusan and Chinhae. He was greatly impressed with the spirit and determination of the young navy and directed CTF 95 to institute a comprehensive program for its operational development, training, and logistic support.<sup>13</sup> Immediately following this visit and change of command relationship, USN ships were assigned with ROKN ships in combined Naval Gunfire Groups. Also USN ships were assigned roles of Anti-Air protection to ROKN ships engaged in coastal patrol and blockade missions. From this point until the end of the war, ROKN and USN minesweepers routinely conducted integrated minesweeping operations.

#### Task Assigned To Naval Forces

Table (1) summarizes the major tasks assigned Naval forces in the Korean AO from war start to Armistice. (R) indicate the task was assigned to ROKN, (U) indicates the task was assigned to USN forces, {C} indicates combined operations by ROK and USN forces (not integrated), and (CI) indicate combined operation involving integrated ROK-U.S. forces.

<b>TABLE I</b>		
<b>Major Task assigned NCC</b>	<b>War Start</b>	<b>Armistice</b>
Conduct ASW operations	(U)	(U)
Conduct ASUW operations	(U)	{C}
Conduct AAW Operations	(U)	(U)
Protect SLOCs and reinforcement shipping	(U)	{C}
Prevent seaborne nKSOF infiltration	{C}	{C}
MCM operations	{C}	(CI)
Strike operations in support of GCC	(U)	(U)
Close Air Support in support of GCC	(U)	(U)
Naval Ship Fire Support on coastal roads	{C}	(CI)
Harbor and island defense	{R}	{C}

Table (1) indicates that at the start of the Korean War, of ten major tasks assigned Naval forces in the Korean AO, 30% could be labeled combined (USN-ROKN) operations, with no integrated operations. By Armistice, three years later, 60% of the naval tasks were being conducted by both ROKN and USN forces and 20% of these tasks involved the actual integration of USN forces with ROKN forces.

#### Korean War Lessons Learned

Some of the most important lessons learned during the Korean War concerning combined naval operations were:

- ROKN vessels were more effective in providing Naval Gunfire Support to the ROK Army Division on coastal roads (no language barriers). These forces were most effective when USN forces provided air and surface protection.
- ROKN possessed many small patrol crafts that were more suitable for anti-junk and anti-fishing boat operations in the coastal and inter-island areas. These forces were more efficient when covered by U.S. or U.N. destroyer type vessels.
- ROKN minesweeping force increased in proficiency when operating in company with U.S. and U.N. minesweepers. By Armistice the ROKN minesweepers were considered very capable minesweeping force.
- Communication between ROKN and USN forces was difficult, confusing, and time consuming.
- ROKN-USN forces need a real-time ship to ship and ship to air IFF system.
- ROKN frigates and patrol craft were able to relieve the U.S. and U.N. destroyer types of harbor and coastal defense mission so that they could be better used for blockade, antisurface, antisubsurface, and antiair roles.<sup>14</sup>

By Armistice, SEVENTH Fleet, operating with the majority of naval forces under its command i.e., **unity of command**, and was taking advantage of the unique ability and increased capability of ROKN vessels to augment and assist USN vessels in the accomplishment of its mission.

*"Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort."*  
Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer

## **POST-KOREAN WAR**

On 7 June 1976, the first Field Training Exercise, "*Team Spirit 76*," was conducted as a joint ROK-U.S. combined air, naval, and ground exercise. In 1983, the Exercise "*Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL)*" was conducted as a ROK-U.S. combined air, naval, and ground Command Post Exercise (CPX). The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC) was officially activated on 7 November 1978. Designed to act as an interim mechanism by which the operational control of the ROK armed forces would, in part, be returned to the Koreans, the new CINCCFC structure enabled top ROK military officers to participate in operational decision making. Half the staff positions were filled by Korean officers, headed by a U.S. four star general who puts on the hat of Commander Eighth Army and U.N. Commander.<sup>15</sup> This command relationship is reflected in Figure (4) and indicates the unity of command of the Combined Forces Command.

Command relationships in the Pacific changed many times between 1978 and 1991. By 1991 the Armistice (figure 5) and war time (figure 6) command relationships had matured into extremely complex relationships. A few of the major players involved in the direction and execution of combined naval operations in this arena include:

#### U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)

USPACOM normally exercises combatant command of major combat-ready forces through the commanders of three subordinate unified commands (USFK, USFJ and ALCOM) and one standing joint task forces (JTF 5). The component service commanders are Commander U.S. Army Forces (USARPAC); Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT); Commander U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (USMARFORPAC) and Commander U.S. Pacific Air Forces (USPACAF). Both subordinate unified and service component commanders are responsible to USPACOM for accomplishing assigned missions and tasks.<sup>16</sup>

#### Commander U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) (USFK)

As a subordinate unified commander, USFK coordinates U.S. joint service matters in Korea and is directly subordinate to USPACOM. Commander Eighth U.S. Army (CDREUSA), U.S. Air Forces Korea (COMUSAFK), U.S. Naval Forces Korea (COMNAVFORKOREA), and Marine Forces Korea (COMMARFORK) are the service components of USFK. Finally, as CINCUNC, USFK reports directly to the NCA through the CJCS. In this scenario, USPACOM becomes supporting commander to CINCUNC.

#### United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC)

These are separate commands, but operate in unison within one campaign plan for the defense of Korea. CINCUNC/CFC is a dual hatted position and is a four star U.S. General Officer. As CINCUNC he takes directives from the U.S. NCA based upon existing U.N. resolutions. As CINCCFC, he takes directives from the Korean National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA) to execute the combined defense of the Republic of Korea.

The CINCCFC hat is probably the most complex. Upon implementation of approved Bi-national war plans in response to an attack on South Korea and, if authorized by the NCA through the CJCS, USCINCPAC transfers OPCON of forces to CINCCFC from USFK. As

CINCCFC, he receives strategic direction from U.S. and ROK national policy making bodies – the Security Consultative and the Military Committee. CINCCFC's force structure is also complicated because U.S. Naval Forces remain OPCON to CINCPACFLT and operate *in support* of CINCCFC (Figure 6).<sup>17</sup>

#### Commander In Chief Pacific Fleets (CINCPACFLT)

The U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), headquartered at Makalapa near Pearl Harbor is divided into two parts, operational and administrative. Operational commands are the two numbered fleets, the THIRD Fleet and the SEVENTH Fleet, each commanded by a vice admiral. The Third Fleet is responsible for operations in the Eastern Pacific and along the U.S. West Coast. That fleet also provides training exercises to prepare ships for deployment to the SEVENTH Fleet.<sup>18</sup>

#### Commander SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT)

COMSEVENTHFLT functions as Battle Force SEVENTHFLT for CINCPACFLT, and may be designated as a Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) for USCINCPAC. In these functions the staff plans for, organizes, directs, and assumes operational control of assigned battle force units for the purpose of conducting military operations in designated sea and littoral areas against hostile forces in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

#### Commander Naval Forces Korea (COMNAVFORKOREA) (CNFK)

Headquartered in Seoul, Korea, CNFK is the NCC for USFK. CNFK is responsible to CINCPACFLT for all naval forces on the Korean peninsula. In addition, CNFK is responsible for planning, coordination, and execution of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) of U.S. Navy rear area operations. CNFK maintains a small headquarters staff in Seoul and Chinhae, Korea and has no operational forces.

#### Commander in Chief Republic of Korea Fleet (CINCROKFLT)

Headquartered in Chinhae, Korea, CINCROKFLT is the Combined Naval Component Command (CNCC) for CINCCFC during Armistice. ROKFLT is composed of over 200 vessels

including DD/FF types, minesweepers, numerous patrol craft/boats, amphibious vessels and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA).

## Korean War II

The war time command relationship for the Korean AO by 1991 had evolved to figure (6). To demonstrate the navy command chain as reflected in figure (6), let's look at a scenario of the ROK being attacked by the DPRK in 1991 (the last year prior to the change in command structure).

It is crucial to note that in the transition from Armistice (figure 5) to the wartime command relationship (figure 6), SEVENTHFLT remains under the OPCON of CINCPACFLT. CNFK becomes the Deputy NCC and CINCROKFLT is the Combined Naval Component Commander in name only because CNFK has no operational forces. U.S. Naval Forces (USNAVFOR) in the Korean AO, OPCON to SEVENTHFLT, operate **in support of** CINCCFC and **in coordination** with CNCC. ROKFLT headquartered ashore in Chinhae, OPCON to CINCCFC, **coordinate** their operations with USNAVFOR.<sup>19</sup> At this point the U.S.-ROK Army and Air Force are functioning as combined component commands, however, there are two independent navies, operating in the same AO, reporting to different commanders (one 4,000 miles away). Two navy forces that **should cooperate and coordinate** are now in a scenario fraught with disaster and very similar to the Battle of Leyte Gulf! The navy's side of this Korean War II scenario would not have unity of command and may not have unity of effort, in other words a poorer arrangement than USN-ROKN forces started with during the first Korean War.

## Task Assigned To Naval Forces

The command structure described above was utilized in Combined *Exercises "Team Spirit"* and *"Ulchi Focus Lens"* from 1983 until 1991. The task assigned the naval forces during those exercises are very similar to the task assigned during the Korean War (1950). For consistency, this analysis compares Korean War II against the same tasks assigned the Naval Component Commander at Armistice of Korean War I. This comparison is reflected in Table (2).

TABLE II			
Major Task assigned NCC	KW I	KW II	KW III
Conduct ASW operations	(U)	(U)	
Conduct ASUW operations	{C}	{C}	
Conduct AAW Operations	(U)	(U)	
Protect SLOCs and reinforcement shipping.	{C}	{C}	
Prevent seaborne nKSOF infiltration	{C}	{R}	
MCM operations	(CI)	{R}	
Strike operations in support of GCC	(U)	(U)	
Close Air Support in support of GCC	(U)	(U)	
Naval Ship Fire Support on coastal roads	(CI)	{CI}	
Harbor and island defense	{C}	{R}	

The above table indicates that at the start of the 1991 Korean War (KWII), of ten major task assigned Naval forces in the Korean AO, 30% could be labeled combined (USN-ROKN) operations, with 10% integrated operations. This is a decline of 20% in combined operations from the 1953 Armistice. The decline in integrated operations indicates the different directions taken by the ROKN and USN during the post-war years.

In the years after the Korean war, the U.S. Navy attention was focused on Vietnam, Iran-Iraq, and the anticipated "blue water" battle against the Soviet Union. Littoral warfare in the Korean AO was forgotten and so was integrated operations with the ROKN. Exercise "Team Spirit" became a check in the block for Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) on the way to Northern Pacific, Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf. Exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens" became a CPX for naval reserves and naval forces assigned ashore in Korea, receiving little or no attention by SEVENTH staff or forces. The ROKN continued to concentrate on littoral warfare, creating a navy composed of many highly capable destroyers, frigates, patrol craft and minesweepers. Nonetheless, still at the bottom of the Korean Military "food chain" and with little opportunity to interact with the U.S. Navy, the ROK Navy proficiency declined and the technological gap between the U.S. and ROK Navy widened drastically.

### Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from Exercises "Ulchi Focus Len" and "Team Spirit" between 1989-1991 were remarkably similar to the lessons learned from the Korean war 36 years ago.

- Coordinating two navies in the restricted waters off the Korean peninsula was extremely complicated and resulted in several cases of "blue on blue" attacks.
- Coordinating the turnover between USN and ROKN ASW assets were extremely complicated and time consuming, often resulting in lost of contact.

- Coordinating quick reaction operations between USN and ROKN assets, such as antisurface "Kill Box" tactics, proved to be nearly impossible due to communications difficulties.
- ROKN possessed the majority of the surface ship mine countermeasures (SMCM) forces, however they were not trained to USN levels of proficiency and were unable to operate with USN air mine countermeasures (AMCM) assets.
- USN and ROKN did not have common tactical procedures to facilitate combined operations.
- Communications between USNAVFOR battle staff (at sea) ROKFLT battle staff (ashore) were troublesome, making it extremely difficult to coordinate integrated operations.<sup>20</sup>

By 1991, SEVENTH Fleet was no longer able to take advantage of the unique ability and capability of ROKN vessels to augment and assist USN vessels. Separating SEVENTHFLT from the Combined Forces Command and placing then OPCON of CINCPACFLT during a Korean war scenario clearly resulted in a loss of **unity of command** for naval operations. During the years after the Korean War (1953), this resulted in a definite loss in ability to conduct combined operations with the Korean Navy.

*"Most importantly, combined commands should be organized prior to war."*  
General Sir Archibald Wavell

### ***CURRENT COMMAND RELATIONSHIP***

On 11 January 1992, U.S. Pacific Command, Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). This MOA stated that:

When required for deterrence or warfighting, USPACOM will, with the approval of the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA), place the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet and his maritime forces under the Operational Control of ROK/U.S. CFC upon its arrival in the Korean Area of Operations. At that time Commander SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT), a U.S. VADM, becomes Commander Combined Naval Component Command (CCNCC). With the approval of ROK National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA) the Commander, ROK Naval Operations Command (COMNAVOPSCOM) becomes Deputy Commander Combined Naval Component Command. When COMSEVENTHFLT assumes CCNCC responsibilities, he will exercise OPCON of U.S. Naval Forces (USNAVFOR) and ROK Naval Forces (ROKFLT).<sup>21</sup>

The above paragraph marked the most significant change in command relationships for the SEVENTHFLT since 1950. This MOA made SEVENTHFLT not only the Combined Naval



Component Commander, but also the NCC for CINCCFC. Initially the significance of that item was not readily recognized. According to Joint Pub 0-2:

A combatant command-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all the Service forces... the senior officer of each Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is designated the commander of the Service component forces.<sup>22</sup>

The above paragraph means that COMSEVENTHFLT, as senior naval officer assigned to CINCCFC is responsible for **ALL** U.S. naval forces in country and in the maritime area of operations. Therefore, COMSEVENTHFLT, upon designation as NCC, also became the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Korea (COMUSNAVFORKOREA). After designation as CINCCFC's wartime NCC, SEVENTH Fleet rapidly became USFK and CFC's number one point of contact for all naval planning and operations, including RSO&I and Rear Area Security for Naval forces ashore. SEVENTH Fleet was now inexorably tied to the Korean peninsula, whether this was an advantage or not remained to be seen. The wire diagram for the current wartime command relationship is reflected in figure (7).

### Korean War III

It is important to note in figure (7) that CCNCC (COMSEVENTHFLT) is OPCON to CINCCFC, and that **ALL** naval forces in the Korean AO report to CCNCC. **Unity of command** has been regained. To demonstrate the command chain reflected in figure (7), let's look at a scenario of the ROK being attacked by the DPRK in 1995. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Korean War III has commenced.

### Task Assigned To Naval Forces

The CCNCC command structure was first utilized in Exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens 1992", however, a combined OPLAN was not utilized until 1994. Table (3) is a comparison of task assigned to naval forces by Armistice of the Korean War, to the Korean War II scenario, and to the current CCNCC command structure (Korean War III).

TABLE III			
Major Task assigned NCC	KW I	KW II	KW III
Conduct ASW operations	(U)	(U)	{C}
Conduct ASUW operations	{C}	{C}	(CI)
Conduct AAW Operations	(U)	(U)	(U)

Protect SLOCs and reinforcement shipping.	{C}	{C}	(CI)
Prevent seaborne nKSOF infiltration	{C}	{R}	(CI)
MCM operations	(CI)	{R}	(CI)
Strike operations in support of GCC	(U)	(U)	(U)
Close Air Support in support of GCC	(U)	(U)	(U)
Naval Ship Fire Support on coastal roads	(CI)	{CI}	(CI)
Harbor and island defense	{C}	{R}	(CI)

Table (3) indicates that under the current command relationship, of ten major tasks assigned Naval forces in the Korean AO, 70% could be labeled combined (USN-ROKN) operations, with 60 % of those **integrated operations**. This is an increase of 40 % in combined operations from the 1991 War (KWII) and increase of 50% in integrated operations. The dramatic increase reflected in combined and integrated operations (figure 8) can be directly traced to the change in command relationship that forced SEVENTHFLT to develop closer relationships on the Korean peninsula and on the Navy's change in attitude toward combined and littoral warfare.

#### Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from exercise "*Ulchi Focus Len*" between 1994-1995, reflect major improvements in SEVENTHFLT-ROKFLT ability to wage combined naval operations.

Improvements included:

- The CCNCC combined battle staff facilitated communications between SEVENTHFLT and ROKFLT.
- USN-ROKN Mine Warfare assets were integrated under ROKN command. Training conducted between U.S.-ROK SMCM and AMCM platforms improved ability to clear harbors and Q-routes rapidly.
- Monthly Anti-SOF exercises conducted by ROK surface forces and U.S. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) improved ability to counter North Korean infiltration tactics.
- Establishment of 15 Operational Tasking (OPTASK) facilitated combined ASW, ASUW, and AAW operations.

Some of the major combined problems still unresolved from those exercises include:

- Combined Battle Staff not responsive to ROKN forces.
- The number one lesson learned from the ROKN perspective of the last three combined exercises has been the training and composition of the combined battle staff. The CCNCC Battle Staff is not combined until after turnover between CINCROKLT and CCNCC. This has occurred during several exercise within hours of the commencement of actual hostilities.<sup>23</sup>

Of the lessons learned during recent combined exercises, the composition and training of the combined battle staff may be the most critical to continued success of combined naval

operations. There has been considerable debate between CINCROKFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT on this subject, inevitably reaching the highest levels of both the ROK and U.S. Navy. CINCROKFLT desires to have staff officers permanently assigned to the SEVENTHFLT staff during peacetime. CINCROKFLT contends that the learning curve for the ROK staff officers is too steep to wait until hostilities or imminent hostilities to combine the staffs. ROK staff officers reporting to the flag ship for the first time must learn the ship, the C4I architecture, and the procedures of the battle staff. SEVENTH Fleet understands those issues but conducts combined operations with many countries from Hawaii to the shores of Africa. The political difficulties of having ROK naval officers on board during these exercise/port visits, not to mention the security and disclosure issues make it extremely difficult to permanently station ROK naval officers on the SEVENTH Fleet flag ship. Resolution of this issue could will have lasting effects on the ROKN-USN relationship.

*"Coalition warfare is both complex and complicated, the paradox is that while often a source of strength, coalitions are as often a weakness as well."*<sup>24</sup>

### **RECOMMENDATION**

A small number of ROKN staff officers should be permanently assigned to the SEVENTH Fleet staff. These officers would be the nucleus of the ROK combined contingent during periods of increased tensions. The security/disclosure issues are difficult, but are not irresolute. Multi-Level Secure operating software systems can be utilized onboard the SEVENTH Fleet Flag ship to solve security and disclosure problems. During sensitive port visits and exercises, ROKN officers could be assigned to SEVENTH Fleet shore detachments. Eventually ROKN officers must be allowed the opportunity to develop as full combined battle staff officers if our ability to conduct combined operations in the Korean AO is to improve.

The development of collective team building skills compliments the development of individual skills in the creation of a joint battle staff. Schools and self-development cannot replicate the integration and synchronization lessons learned while training in a unit. Only through actual rehearsal of battle staff procedures during realistic exercises with your actual counterparts, can you develop the cohesion and mutual trust required in an effectively functioning battle staff.<sup>25</sup> Thomas Morely points out in the Military Review that:

Collective battle staff training is essential. Initiative and flexibility rest on a staff's ability to act within a cohesive framework of mutual understanding of concepts and language. Commanders must be able to gauge strengths and weaknesses; recognize styles and propensities. Rigorous training of stabilized staffs makes these things possible.<sup>26</sup>

**"We must break down the barriers of misconception, bias and fear and make battle staff training a reality" Thomas Morely**


## **CONCLUSION**

The designation of Commander SEVENTH Fleet as CCNCC was a significant change in command relationship between the two navies in the Korean Area of Operations. This change, which reestablished the unity of command lost after the Korean War, has considerably improved SEVENTH Fleet's interaction with the ROK Navy. There is however, room for improving our combined naval operations.


The most important element in preparing for combined operation is developing sound and effective coalition command relationships.<sup>27</sup> That relationship established, we must now optimize the strengths of the two fleets, avoid duplication, and concentrate on interoperability and combined training. Both the planning and execution of combined operations must be accomplished as a coordinated effort. Combined staffs are ideal means of ensuring that multinational forces are utilized in compliance with national political and military restrictions.<sup>28</sup> General Riscassi, in *Principles of Coalition Warfare*, points out that eliminating any seams between American and South Korean forces was vital to sustaining agility during the Korean War. Tactical operations should be designed to create a seamless battlefield, and forces must actually engage together in battle and function synergistically to defeat an enemy.<sup>29</sup> Naval forces in the Korean AO have not reached this state of integration, however, their recent improvement in performance can be directly traced to the assignment of COMSEVENTHFLT as Commander Combined Naval Component Command. If we are to maximize the unique capability of the USN-ROK Naval forces in the Korean AO we must operate under **a single commander**, i.e., unity of command. In order for this single commander to function effectively, the commander must have a combined battle staff organized, trained and exercised before war.

***Almost all things have been found out, but some have been forgotten.***  
Aristotle


**Figure 1**  
**ComNavFE Command Relations**




**Figure 2**  
**COMNAVFE with Task Force 95 (Combined)**




**Figure 3**  
**COMSEVENTHFLT Combined Forces**




**Figure 4**  
**1978 Combined Forces Relationships**




**Figure 5**  
**1991 Armistice Command Relationship**




**Figure 6**  
**1991 War-time Command Relationship**



**Figure 7**  
**1995 War-time Command Relationship**



**Figure 8**  
**1953-95 Combined Operations Graph**





## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint Pub 0-2 (Washington DC: 24 February 1995), I-9

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (1 February 1995), VI-1

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, I-3

<sup>4</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 14 June 1993), 2-5

<sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (10 January 1995), III-13

<sup>6</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, A-3

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., A-2

<sup>8</sup> Curtis A. Utz, Assault from the Sea, The Amphibious Landing at Inchon, (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994), 1

<sup>8</sup> James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: KOREA, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), 51

<sup>10</sup> Utz, 8

<sup>11</sup> James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: KOREA, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), 269

<sup>12</sup> Commander In Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report on Korea - Blockade and Escort Operations, (30 April 1951), 1338

<sup>13</sup> Commander SEVENTH Fleet Report of Operations, (28 March 1951 to 3 March 1952), 11

<sup>14</sup> Commander In Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Reports on the Korean War, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, (16 November 1950 to 30 April 1953). Lessons learned were taken from a variety of reports submitted from COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT during the Korean War.

<sup>15</sup> Suk Lee Bok, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987), 22

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<sup>16</sup> John K. Wilson, USCINCPAC – Now and in the Future, (U.S. Air University. Air War College, 1990), 3

<sup>17</sup> Taek-Hyung Rhee, U.S.-ROK Combined Operations: A Korean Perspective, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986), 45-50

<sup>18</sup> Wilson, 3-5

<sup>19</sup> Commander SEVENTH Fleet USNAVFOR OPLAN 5027-92, Basic Plan, (1992), 10

<sup>20</sup> “Ulchi Focus Lens and Team Spirit Lessons Learned.” JM-83-1/91-1 JULLS no. 03433-01202. UNCLASSIFIED. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System. Lessons learned taken from Exercises “Ulchi Focus Lens” and “Team Spirit” conducted between 1983-1991.

<sup>21</sup> ROK-U.S. Military Committee Memorandum of Agreement (Seoul, Korea: 11 January 1992), 1

<sup>22</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, IV-12

<sup>23</sup> “Ulchi Focus Lens Lessons Learned.” JM-92-1/94-1 JULLS no.06762-92112. UNCLASSIFIED. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System. Lessons learned taken from Exercises “Ulchi Focus Lens” conducted between 1992-1994.

<sup>24</sup> Mark O. Schissler, “Coalition warfare: More Power or More Problems?” Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1993, 2

<sup>25</sup> Robert G. Gorrie, “Joint Battle Staff Training” Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1991, 2-7

<sup>26</sup> Thomas V. Morely, “Too Important to Ignore: Training Field Grade Officers in Units”, Military Review, Washington: January 1991, 55-61

<sup>27</sup> Terry J. Pudas, “Preparing Future Coalition Commanders,” (Reprinted from Joint Force Quarterly, 1993-94), 41

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 42

<sup>29</sup> Robert W. Riscassi, “Principles for Coalition Warfare,” (Reprinted from Joint Force Quarterly, 1993), 60

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